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The failure of the vital economic railway link between London and the southwest of the United 27 
Kingdom in the 2014 storm chain incurred up to £1.2bn of economic losses. This incident highlighted 28 
the urgent need to understand the cascading nature of multi hazards involved in storm damage. This 29 
study focuses on the Dawlish railway where a seawall breach caused two months of railway closure in 30 
2014. We used historical and contemporary data of severe weather damage and used failure analysis 31 
to develop a multi-hazard risk model for the railway. Twenty-nine damage events caused significant 32 
line closure in the period 1846-2014. For each event, hazards were identified, the sequence of failures 33 
were deconstructed, and a flowchart for each event was formulated showing the interrelationship of 34 
multiple hazards and their potential to cascade. The most frequent damage mechanisms were 35 
identified: (I) landslide, (II) direct ballast washout, and (III) masonry damage. We developed a risk 36 
model for the railway which has five layers in the op-down order of: (a) root cause (storm); (b) force 37 
generation (debris impact, wave impact, overtopping, excess pore pressure, wind impacts); (c) 38 
common cause failure (slope instability, rail flooding, coping and parapet damage, foundation failure 39 
and masonry damage); (d) cascading failure (landslide, ballast washout, upper masonry seawall 40 
failure, loss of infill material), and (e) network failure forcing service suspension. We identified five 41 
separate failure pathways and damage mechanisms by anal sing these 29 major events.  42 
 43 
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1. Introduction 47 
The United Kingdom has nearly 16,000 km of open rail routes [1] with a significant proportion of 48 
coastal alignment. Most of these are strategically important as they often are the only regional rail 49 
connection, or they provide logistical support to critical national infrastructure. For instance, the 50 
Cumbrian line in the lake district in north-west England (Figure 1c, d), is a vital link providing public 51 
transport as well as freight capacity to the nuclear r processing plant at Sellafield. The area is a 52 
UNESCO world heritage site and a major tourist destination [2]. In Wales, the south and west coastal 53 
railways (Figure 1d) were instrumental in providing infrastructure to support the coal mining and 54 
shipping businesses of the nineteenth century [3]. Where coastal railways are subject to direct wave 55 
action, they are particularly vulnerable to climate change effects including sea level rise (SLR) and 56 
increases in storminess and rainfall [4]. Recent studies have indicated that there is a 20% increase in 57 
the number and intensity of storms [5, 6] while Castelle et al. [7] showed that the winter‐mean wave 58 
height has increased in recent years. The latest marine climate projections for the UK [8] predict mean 59 
sea level rise between 0.39 m and 0.70 m by 2100 dependant on emission scenarios. Network Rail, the 60 
infrastructure owner in the UK, has acknowledged weath r resilience and climate change as a major 61 
risk to future operations, and in response has produce  a series of adaptation plans. The latest is the 62 
“Second Climate Change Adaptation Report” [9], with a third due in 2021 [10]; the organisation has 63 
also contributed to the “Tomorrow's Railway and Climate Change Adaptation”  research programme 64 
[11]. 65 
The section of railway between Exeter and Newton Abbott, UK (Figure 1a) is particularly 66 
vulnerable to climate change effects. In 1845, a vertical seawall was built along the coastal margin to 67 
support the railway alignment in Dawlish [12]. Soft red sandstone cliffs were blasted along the 68 
coastline, with the unconsolidated material used to backfill the area between the cliff face and the 69 
frontage of the masonry seawall. Following the second report by Beeching [13], this section of 70 
railway became part of the Great Western mainline strategically connecting London to the south west 71 
of England. This sole vital economic link was broken during the February 2014 storm when 72 










structural failure on the seawall (Figure 1b, 4, 7d) and precipitated a route closure that lasted two 74 
months [15]. The cost of reinstatement was £50m with associated economic losses estimated at up to 75 
£1.2bn for the South West region [16]. 76 
In this research, we study historical and contemporary data on the failure of the Dawlish railway 77 
by storm induced forces to establish a multi-hazard risk model with cascading failure pathways 78 
(FPW) which could be used with an exposure database to evaluate risk to the structural assets. We use 79 
primary historical accounts and identify damage mechanisms (DM) and FPW that cascade between 80 
separate DM. The innovation in this study is the identification of storm initiated multi-hazards and the 81 
development of cascading structural vulnerabilities of rail network infrastructure in the UK. To our 82 
knowledge, this is one of the pioneering multi-hazard risk models with cascading FPW for rail 83 
networks in coastal settings. The combination of histor cal damage data with contemporary 84 
engineering understanding of cascading risk is a particular strength of this research. A multi-hazard 85 
risk model such as this would be beneficial for improving the resilience of the railway network to 86 













Figure 1. a) The location of the railway at Dawlish. b) Major damage after the February 2014 storm 91 
(Matt Clark, Met Office UK). c) The coastal railway near Sellafield in Cumbria. d) Map of Great 92 
Britain showing the extent of coastal railways (red lines).  93 
2. Literature Review 94 
 Differences of language used in Disaster Risk Management studies by diverse disciplines has led 95 
to an effort for harmonisation in terminology as identified by Kappes et al. [17] and more recently 96 











Risk () is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change [19] as the product of 98 
hazard () and consequence ():  99 
  =  ⨯   (1) 100 
Civil and Structural Engineers often define risk by expanding the definition of consequence as the 101 
product of structural vulnerability () and exposure () [20]: 102 
  =  ⨯   ⨯   (2) 103 
In this study we have developed a model which combines the hazard and vulnerability of the 104 
engineering assets, respecting the intrinsic link between hazardous force generation and propensity for 105 
damage as represented by structural vulnerability. The benefit of this approach is that the exposure 106 
has been decoupled from the structural vulnerability. This allows multiple stakeholders to interrogate 107 
the model using their own exposure metrics to provide tailored evaluations of overall risk (e.g. 108 
insurance providers for loss quantification, Network Rail for maintenance and capital expenditure and 109 
local authorities for disaster risk planning). This infers the risk model proposed is specific to similar 110 
hazard events (i.e. extratropical cyclonic storms temporally coincident with high spring tides and 111 
strong onshore winds) for infrastructure with common characteristics (coastal railways with vertical 112 
masonry seawalls subject to direct wave action). 113 
The challenges of analysing multi-hazards have been comprehensively reviewed and discussed 114 
by Kappes et al. [17] who make the relation between multi-hazard analysis and the objective of risk 115 
reduction. In the first multi-hazard approach, the authors argue that the idea of relevance is of prime 116 
importance in a defined area (the all-hazards-at-a-place approach) [21] (Table 1). The present study 117 
meets this criterion with the qualification that this is a study of critical civil engineering transport 118 
infrastructure and more specifically that of a coastal railway in the south west of England. In their 119 
second “thematically defined” approach Kappes et al. [17] introduce the idea of multi-hazard as “one 120 
hazard that triggers a second process” and go on toargue that one event may cause multiple threats – 121 
here too the present study meets this criterion. Our root cause initiating hazard is shown to generate 122 










Holistic treatment of multi-hazard risk (Table 1) is important, not least because “hazards are 124 
related and influence each other” [17], hence the idea of hazard chains or cascades [22, 23, 24]. The 125 
idea of hazard events having a cascading effect on interlinked systems has recently been developed 126 
and reviewed by Pescaroli et al. [25] and Pescaroli [26] in the area of emergency risk management 127 
while Huggins et al. [27] has recently reviewed thecascading effects due to rain-related incidents. 128 
Climate change has been linked to increased severity of hazard events. For a transportation system 129 
such as a coastal railway, which is subject to multi-hazard risk scenarios, the potential for cascading 130 
effects is amplified - especially when the network is critical infrastructure. This study identifies and 131 
proposes the elements of failure which may cascade across DM and have the effect of increasing the 132 
severity of the disaster event. 133 
In terms of civil engineering infrastructure, Gardoni and LaFave [28] assert that mitigation of risk 134 
must account for the impact of combined natural andthropogenic hazards, and that remedial 135 
strategies should account for infrastructure life cycles taking into account aging and deterioration. 136 
This idea of a dynamic vulnerability, as the hazard evolves and the assets age, is developed by Gill 137 
and Malamud [29] who define cascades as interaction networks of hazard and detail the need to 138 
include these interactions in any multi-hazard risk framework. The authors have incorporated this 139 
approach by developing separate force generating mechanisms from one initiating event in the 140 
proposed model. A generalised multi-hazard risk model for coastal infrastructure damage was 141 
proposed by Heidarzadeh et al. [30] for Dominica in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria and Japan 142 
following the 2016 Typhoon Lionrock [31]. Although t e work included seawall and subsequent road 143 
damage, it did not deal with a complex interconnected and dense transport infrastructure like the UK 144 
rail network or detail the specific structural components of the infrastructure concerned. Similarly, 145 
Mase et al. [32] analysed the climate change effects on earthen dyke reliability and proposed a 146 
generalised model of FPW, however these were exclusively based on wave overtopping rates as a 147 
surrogate of total force generation and detailed only li ear FPW. This approach may prove simplistic 148 
for a complex rail network built on an historic masonry structure. For a cascading series of events, 149 









wave energy maybe missed. Gill and Malamud [33] discus  the spatial overlap and temporal 151 
likelihood of natural hazard interactions. These considerations have been incorporated into our study 152 
where we detail a DM that includes landslide – often these events are temporally offset by days or 153 
weeks compared to the more immediate DM associated with masonry failure or undermining of 154 
foundations. Inherent in the approach of Pescaroli nd Alexander [34] is the acceptance that cascading 155 
events may involve damage to many disparate naturally occurring and man-made networks so 156 
increasing their overall effect. Van Eeten et al. [35] discuss the multi-hazard nature of cascading 157 
failures across critical infrastructure and contend that their occurrence is much more common than 158 
originally thought. Zscheischler et al. [36] recently introduced the idea of compound events defined as 159 
a combination of multiple drivers and hazards which are responsible for many of the most severe 160 
weather and climate related impacts. 161 
Table 1. Nomenclature used in this paper where not explicitly defined elsewhere in the text. 162 
Terminology Definition Reference 
Risk 
Risk can be defined as a function between hazard and vul erability, 
which can provide answers regarding the preparation (or ot) of an 
individual, community, or system. 
Monte et al. [18] 
Multi-hazard risk 
The term multi-hazard risk refers to the risk arising from multiple 
hazards. By contrast, the term multi-risk would relat  to multiple 
risks such as economic, ecological, social, etc. 
Kappes et al. [17] 
Cascading 
“…one type of phenomena can clearly be distinguished: the 
triggering of one hazard by another, eventually leading to subsequent 
hazard events. This is referred to as c cade, domino effect, follow-on 
event, knock-on effect, or triggering effect.” 
Kappes et al. [17] 
Delmonaco et al. [37] 
Carpignano et al. [38] 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability can be defined as the state of community fragility and 
the system in which it lives based on its physical, social, cultural, 
economic, technological, and political aspects, thereby diminishing 
all capacities. Whereas the vulnerability of transport systems is 
commonly assessed in terms of physical vulnerability of its 
components depending on the physical characteristics of the 
infrastructure assets, e.g. age, material, structural ypes, and 
functional vulnerability depending on the functional characteristics of 
the network, e.g. capacity and speed. 
Monte et al. [18] 
Birkmann et al. [39] 
Resilience 
The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the 
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic 




Each force generated by the root cause or initiating hazard scenario 
gives rise to a damage mechanism, which links the force to the 















The path force is transmitted through the structural elements giving 




The presence (location) of people, livelihoods, environmental 
services and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural 
assets in places that could be adversely affected by physical events 
and which, thereby, are subject to potential future harm, loss, or 
damage. 
Monte et al. [18] 
UNIPCC [19] 
Disaster 
A disaster of natural origin can be considered the “materialization” of 
risk or the product of interactions between natural phenomena and 
individuals, communities, or systems in a given area and time that 
causes a rupture in social well-being and requires external assistance. 
Monte et al. [18] 
 163 
3. Methods and Data 164 
Archival research of historical damage data and interpretation of damage information was used in 165 
combination for this study. This approach has been widely applied in the past for natural hazard 166 
analysis, for example by Soloviev [40], Ambraseys and Melvill [41] and Heidarzadeh et al. [42]. We 167 
establish DM associated with each event, detail the multi-hazards triggered (e.g. wave overtopping, 168 
wave impacts or excess soil pore pressure) and identify the cascading nature of the hazards. Research 169 
was undertaken to investigate the frequency of occurrence and nature of the damage suffered by the 170 
seawall in Dawlish from the date of work commencing i  1845 until the February 2014 storms. The 171 
British Newspaper Archive at the British Library1 facilitated a comprehensive review of damage 172 
reports with some details of prevailing weather andsea conditions that led to failure (Figure 2a). The 173 
historical records were cross referenced for accuray with additional resources provided by Brunel 174 
University London (BUL) Special Collections2, The National Archives at Kew (TNA)3, University of 175 
Bristol Brunel Collection4, the UK Institution of Civil Engineers5 and Network Rail6. The historical 176 
record up to the late 1980’s was comprehensively detailed in Kay’s work on the history of the Exeter 177 
















to Newton Abbott line which benefitted from personal i terviews with the dedicated “seawall gang” 178 
of technicians and masons based at Dawlish station, whose job was to constantly survey and maintain 179 
the fabric of the seawall [43]. The railway damage information is compiled into Table 2. From a large 180 
list of numerous damage incidents, we study significant failure events. A significant event is defined 181 
as one which led to either the complete closure of the line for at least twelve hours or required one f 182 
the lines to be closed for at least one day (single line closure; Table 2, Column 5). In total, 29 separate 183 
incidents of significant failure were discovered in the 169-year history of the line to 2014 and are 184 
listed in Table 2. A more comprehensive list of events affecting the railway line was also compiled by 185 
Dawson et al. [44] although their interest was focussed on human geography and anticipated sea level 186 
rise. We limited our entries in Table 2 to events which demonstrated major failure mechanisms of the 187 
engineered assets using the criteria above since our objective is to establish a multi-hazard risk model. 188 
The result is that we do not include minor incidents which may, for instance, result in speed 189 
restrictions or delay on the line or those which are regularly corrected by the dedicated team of 190 
maintenance linesmen based at Dawlish station. By adopting this approach, we have satisfied the 191 
criterion of “cut-off” [21] where the severity of an event is defined by its spatial scale and relevance – 192 
in effect we have defined the exposure by quantifyig the extent of the network failure. This allows 193 
stakeholders to use the model to determine the scal of loss for an individual event and to understand 194 
the probable FPW which contribute to loss of service. 195 
In this research we applied a multi-hazard risk asses ment methodology, considering cascading 196 
failure paths to analyse historical failure events, previous work was undertaken by Marzocchi et al. 197 
[23] and Egli [45] with event tree analysis which provides a basis for our approach. In the present 198 
study we modified a top-down Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [46] and bottom-up Failure Mode and 199 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) [47] to fit the known observd damage events (Table 2). We then applied 200 
engineering judgement to infer any intermediate failure paths which led to a known network failure 201 
condition while being consistent with the historical record. For the most recent events, where detailed 202 
records are available, the FMEA route was chosen. Where the severity of the hazard data was 203 










made through temporal alignment of the failure events over successive decades. For each incident we 205 
produced a diagram detailing the specific elements of common cause failure (a FPW within a DM) 206 
and cascading failure (a FPW linking different DM) leading to network failure (an exposure) 207 
stemming from an initiating root cause hazard, in th s case a storm.  208 
We then aggregated these into a model following the s ructure of Lee [48] and developed it by 209 
adding an intermediate force generating step in the DM between the root cause and common cause 210 
failure lanes. The root cause encapsulates the initiat g hazard which in our model is a storm which 211 
leads to service suspension. In reality, the hazard is a complex combination of extra-tropical cyclonic 212 
weather systems, sometimes appearing as series of discrete events, temporally aligned with high 213 
spring tidal cycles, prolonged rainfall and easterly o  south-easterly prevailing winds. In combination, 214 
they generate large and violent waves which can impart destructive energy onto the railway 215 
infrastructure. The forces that are generated becaus  of this hazard sequence are divided broadly into 216 
wind dominated, hydrodynamic (or wave) and geotechnical effects which in turn initiate a primary 217 
common cause failure. We define a common cause failure here as a series of simultaneous multiple 218 
failures that result from a single event [49,50], which can subsequently cascade across DM, increasing 219 
the severity of the disaster and precipitating a servic  suspension. 220 









Table 2. Significant damage events on the Dawlish Mainline from its construction in 1846 to 222 












05/10/1846 Seawall Breeches Rock 3.0 N/A Masonry Damage (5) 
20/11/1846 Seawall Cockwood 1.0 N/A Masonry Damage (5) 
26/12/1852 Cliff Face Breeches Rock 0.5 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
28/12/1852 Cliff Face Breeches Rock 7.0 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
04/02/1853 Cliff Face W Kennaway 3.0 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
13/02/1853 Cliff Face W Kennaway 0.5 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
16/02/1855 Seawall Smugglers Lane 12.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
25/10/1859 Seawall Sprey Point 3.0 N/A Flooding of Rails (2) 
31/01/1869 Seawall Sea Lawn 5.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
25/12/1872 Seawall Rockstone 1.0 N/A Masonry Damage (5) 
30/12/1872 Seawall Rockstone N/A 2.0 Toe Scour (4) 
11/01/1873 Seawall Rockstone 1.0 7.0 Masonry Damage (5) 
01/02/1873 Seawall Rockstone 3.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
01/12/1874 Cliff Face N/A 3.0 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
01/12/1875 Cliff Face N/A 1.0 N/A Slope Instability (1) 
03/02/1916 Seawall Rockstone N/A 1.0 Toe Scour (4) 
12/03/1923 Cliff Face Sprey Point 3.0 8.0 Slope Instability (1) 
24/12/1929 Seawall Sea Lawn N/A 2.0 Toe Scour (4) 
04/01/1930 Seawall Sea Lawn 5.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
10/02/1936 River Wall Powderham 3.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
01/03/1962 Seawall Rockstone 0.5 8.0 
Coping & Parapet Walls 
(3) 
11/02/1974 Station Dawlish Station 0.5 5.0 Wave Debris Damage (-) 
26/02/1986 Seawall Smugglers Lane 6.0 7.0 Toe Scour (4) 
01/01/1996 Seawall Rockstone 7.0 N/A Toe Scour (4) 
01/12/2000 Seawall Sprey Point 3.0 
N/A Masonry Damage (5) & 
Slope Instability (1) 
27/10/2004 Seawall Smugglers Lane 5.0 N/A Masonry Damage (5) 
22/09/2006 Track Dawlish Station N/A 3.0 Wind Damage (-) 
08/04/2013 Seawall N/A 
N/A 
3.0 
Coping & Parapet Walls 
(3) 
05/02/2014 Seawall Sea Lawn 56.0 N/A 
Masonry Damage (5) & 












Figure 2. a) Newspaper extract detailing damage to Dawlish seawall and engineering remedies [51]. 226 
b) Nineteenth Century Admiralty map of Dawlish showing ordinary tide high water and 227 
annotated with site of the February 2014 seawall failure [52]. 228 
 229 
4. Historical records of railway damage  230 
Despite Victorian (1837-1901 AD) engineering determination that man could curtail the action of 231 










(Figure 2a), damage to the railway’s seawall and associated engineering assets were a feature of 233 
constructing and operating the railway in Dawlish from the beginning in 1845. Initial damage was to 234 
the wall structure since it was constantly bombarded by energetic coastal waves whilst being built. 235 
Early recognition that stronger materials were needed is reported in the press: “coping and seawall, 236 
formed of massive blocks of sandstone, are destroyed” , while the engineers searched for a local 237 
supply of stronger stone: “… massive wall of Babbicome limestone, with a back filling of layers of 238 
fagot and sandstone.”. The cost of the remedial works to decrease the vulnerability of the seawall 239 
were estimated: “in vain to shrink even from £100,000” [51], which in present-day value is equivalent 240 
to £6m [53]. 241 
However, it was only a few years later that a second hazard was to be identified. The soft 242 
sandstone cliffs that were blasted and used to build the seawall, and subsequently used to backfill the 243 
stronger sections, gave way in the winter of 1852 on two occasions and a few months later in 1853 244 
[43]. In the historical records of significant damage events (Figure 3), 29% of occurrences involved 245 
slope instability or cliff face failure above the railway line, while 62% involved seawall failure 246 
(masonry, coping and toe scour). Successive newspaper re orts and technical records show that 247 
damage was sustained in a similar manner throughout t e life of the railway on average every decade 248 
or so (Table 2). In the few occurrences where seawall failure or geotechnical considerations are not 249 
explicitly mentioned, the force of water due to excssive overtopping has been responsible for 250 
flooding of the rails (3%) while wave debris damage accounted for 3% and direct wind damage a 251 
further 3%. Figure 4 presents some images of major historical damage of a few of the incidents listed 252 
in Table 2.  253 
In all cases of significant damage, weather considerations were implicitly implicated. The 254 
easterly facing embayed nature of the Dawlish coastline makes it vulnerable to high spring tides, 255 
supplemented by storm surge when accompanied by deep cyclonic storms blowing south-easterlies 256 
landwards. Heaps [54] points out that along the southern coastlines of the UK, the tidal conditions at 257 
the time of a storm surge are often the most important factor – high spring tides coupled with 258 










impart strong forces on coastal infrastructure. Figure 2b shows the line of high-water ordinary tides as 260 
being at or above the wall footings. To the east of the site of the 2014 damage at Rockstone, high-261 
water ordinary tide is shown as being beyond the track bed and seawall. In these circumstances it is 262 
not surprising that 11 separate incidents from a tot l of 29 (≈ 38%) can be attributed to the Sea Lawn 263 
and Rockstone areas (Table 2). Dawlish’s soft red sand tone geology and the weathering of the cliffs 264 
in this bay has historically provided material for beach nourishment. The historical and contemporary 265 
accounts are consistent; during extended periods of stormy weather such as encountered during winter 266 
months (November to March), beach levels can be significantly eroded leading to the toe sections of 267 
the wall being uncovered. The lower beach levels lead to higher significant wave heights which in 268 
turn exert higher impact forces on the structure and in turn increased toe scour. 269 
 270 
 Figure 3. Relative predominance of cause of failure on the Dawlish Mainline derived from data in 271 












Figure 4. Position and magnitude of historical damage events o  the coastal section of the Western 275 
Mainline between Exeter and Newton Abbott. The size of the circles and triangles are 276 











5. Risk model for the Dawlish railway 279 
Based on the data in Table 2 and the damage descriptions in historical and contemporary 280 
accounts, we established the multiple hazards contributing to railway failure, their cascading order, 281 
DM and FPW. For each of these we developed a separat  flowchart.  In terms of railway resilience to 282 
storms and weather incidents, such flowcharts are helpful towards identifying the weak links in the 283 
infrastructure system and to the strengthening of th se elements to reduce vulnerability.  284 
We combined the separate flowcharts to form our proposed risk model consisting of five layers of 285 
precedence (Figure 5):  286 
a) A root cause event which contributes to the hazard element of the risk equation  287 
(in our case a storm).  The initiating hazard is temporally coincident with strong easterly to south 288 
easterly winds, sustained rainfall and high spring t des. The combined effect is to significantly 289 
increase energy delivery to the coastline. 290 
b) Hazard force differentiation where discrete energy transfer processes encompassing wind, 291 
wave and excess soil pore pressure are generated. Each of these represent a DM which 292 
consequently initiates: 293 
c) A series of common cause failures (FPW) which can occur simultaneously, are related to 294 
structural vulnerability and lead to:  295 
d) cascading failures which can link separate DM and has the effect of increasing the severity of 296 
the event, and ultimately: 297 
e) Network failure and resulting railway service suspension – exposure. 298 
The three most common damage mechanisms (DM I to DM III) develop five separate failure 299 













Figure 5. Risk model for the Dawlish railway network. Where: ST storm; DM: damage mechanisms; 304 
WD: wave debris impact force; Ue: excess pore pressure in the soil; SI: slope instability; LS: 305 
landslide; WOV: wave overtopping force; FR: flooding of rails; DCPW: damage to coping stones 306 
and parapet walls; BW: ballast washout; WI: wave impact force; DFU: foundations undermined 307 
due to toe scour; DM: damage to masonry elements;  IL: loss of infill material; FUS: failure of 308 
upper sections of wall; GI: Wind impact force; FPW: failure pathway; SS: service suspension. 309 
 310 
5.1 Analysis of damage mechanisms 311 
The risk model identifies five damage mechanisms, each with their own generating force, these 312 










DM I: Excess pore pressure (Ue) in the shear faced cliff soils generated by prolonged rainfall 314 
leading to slope instability and landslide (Figure 6b). 315 
DM II: Overtopping forces (WOV) generated by wave heights incident on the front face of the 316 
seawall energetic enough to propel water above the top surface of the seawall and 317 
onto the back side of the structure, initiating direct ballast washout due to rails 318 
flooding or damage to the coping stones and parapet wall separating the railway from 319 
the seawall frontage (Figure 7). 320 
DM III: Hydraulic impact forces (WI) which involve the transfer of energy from the incoming 321 
waves (whether breaking or not) onto the vertical surface of the seawall, causing 322 
failure of main seawall elements due to masonry damage usually affecting the upper 323 
sections of the wall or due to loss of infill material after foundation failure initiated by 324 
toe scour (Figure 10c). 325 
DM IV: Wave debris impact (WD) which involves the transport of material in the water 326 
column and subsequent impact of that on network infrastructure requiring service 327 
suspension.  328 
DM V: A wind-dominated impact force (GI) which can damage and destroy elements of the 329 
network due to the speed and gusting of the prevailing winds and precipitate a service 330 
suspension. 331 
The first three DM represent 94% of all recorded signif cant events (Figure 3). These three main 332 
DM are discussed in more detail following. Cascading failure between DM II and III result in i direct 333 
ballast washout and ultimate service suspension. We obs rved that more than one mechanism can be 334 
activated in an event. 335 
 336 
5.2 DM I: Landslide due to slope instability (LS, SI, Ue) 337 
Excess pore pressure builds in the soil and leads to slope instability in the shear faced cliffs, 338 










The soft red sandstone rock-faces in south Devon have provided beach material for the coastline 340 
through natural erosion for centuries. When the seawall was erected 170 years ago, a vital supply of 341 
material was isolated from the foreshore; in addition, the blasting of the cliffs to provide even 342 
alignment and backfill, exposed shear faces and steep inclines to weathering by precipitation. The 343 
sandstone is widely folded and faulted along the coast (Figure 6a), and this makes it particularly 344 
unstable when there is a period of extended rainfall. The steep gradients result in frequent landslide 345 
during the winter storm season caused by slope instability as excess pore pressure is released. 346 
Although landslides (Figure 6b) may accompany wave damage of the seawall, they are seldom 347 
reported separately in the historical reports. 348 
 349 
 350 
Figure 6. a) Highly folded and faulted shear faced red sandstone cliffs separated from English 351 
Channel by the Railway line near the Dawlish railway station. b) 20,000 tonne landslides at 352 
Holcombe near Dawlish [55]. 353 
 354 
5.3 DM II: Ballast washout due to wave overtopping (BW, FR, DCPW, WOV) 355 
Ballast washout is the terminal cascading failure which causes service suspension in all cases of 356 
masonry damage from wave overtopping. Despite the engin ers’ assertion that they could “keep out 357 










the top of the coping stones of the seawall near the site of the 2014 collapse (Figure 7a) and this often 359 
leads to preventative line closures when high tide and weather risks coincide [56]. With easterly wind 360 
direction and large waves incident on the seawall [57], the railway has often suffered from wave 361 
overtopping forces which, when significant, can flood the tracks and wash the ballast away (Figure 362 
7c), leaving the railway inoperable. This FPW 2 occurs often and is generally accompanied by 363 
masonry damage or undermining of foundations of the seawall (Figure 7d). 364 
Wave overtopping often results in enough force transfer to activate FPW 3 causing coping stones 365 
at the top of the seawall to be removed or broken (Figure 7b). These large stones, typically granite, ar  366 
then propelled against the adjacent one-metre-high parapet wall that separates the track bed with the 367 
promenade (Figure 7e). The damaged parapet then fails with successive wave overtopping and blocks 368 
the rail line. This can occur over a significant distance along the coastal railway and is usually 369 
repaired by the dedicated line gang based at Dawlish railway station. 370 
 371 
Figure 7. a) Ordinary high tide close to coping stone level, 2018. b) Wave overtopping damage to 372 










overtopping accompanied by parapet wall masonry damage in 2014 [59]. e) Ballast covers on the 374 
line closest to the sea as mitigation for wash-out, 2018. 375 
 376 
5.4 DM III: Toe scour and masonry damage due to wave impact (IL, DFU, DM, FUS, WI) 377 
FPW 4 involves wave impact forces causing damage to the foundations of the seawall due to toe 378 
scour and loss of infill material. This is a bottom-up mechanism, where sections of the wall will often 379 
be affected by lower masonry being removed following destruction of the toe protection (Figure 8). 380 
Here the backfill material behind the upper sections f the wall are not removed so protecting them 381 
from collapse; however, backfill is removed near the oe by suction from successive waves and 382 
eventually the lower masonry sections yield. This is the most common and significant failure 383 
mechanism among the damage incidents studied in this research accounting for 55% of all events 384 
(masonry damage 23% and toe scour 22%) (Figure 3). Wave impact removes large amounts of sand 385 
cover during storms, thereby exposing the footings of the foundations of the main seawall. Toe scour 386 
due to successive wave trains leads to accelerated erosion at the interface of the soft red sandstone 387 
foundation and the more durable rock forming the frontage of the railway seawall. Waves wear away 388 
the foundation and then backfill material is sucked out of the cavity behind the frontage. In the 389 
absence of infill material, masonry damage to the wall fascia is sustained either at low or high level by 390 
wave impact force. This can lead to the rail tracks being left suspended in mid-air (Figure 1b, 4, 10c). 391 
Whereas toe scour is initiated through a bottom-up mechanism, masonry damage is a top-down wave 392 
impact failure, initiated in the seawall by removal of upper courses of masonry. Although this FPW 5 393 
is not the most common it has the potential to be th  most expensive and disruptive, it often 394 
accompanies the top sections of coping and parapet walls failing due to overtopping of waves (FPW 395 
3). Subsequently flooding of the rail bed occurs and ballast is washed away exposing backfill material. 396 
Wave impact forces then remove the upper courses of masonry allowing washback of overtopped 397 
water and infill material to the sea. Repeated actions over a high tide then accentuates the mechanism 398 
and causes further masonry to be removed. The cascading nature of the failure of the upper courses of 399 












Figure 8. Stepped toe protection keyed into existing wall foundations providing increased resistance 403 
to scour. a) Granite faced wall near the site of the 2014 storm da age in Dawlish. b) A section 404 
of original sandstone seawall near Holcombe, Dawlish. 405 
 406 
6. Model Application 407 
 Two applications of the multi-hazard risk model are presented as case studies for the Dawlish 408 
railway below. 409 
6.1 The 1986 incident 410 
Evidence was collated for an incident that occurred on 26th February 1986 following a violent 411 
storm. Dawson et al. [44] used information gathered f om Rogers [60] to detail the remedial works 412 
required following a failure to the seawall (Figure 9a). We cross referenced this material with 413 
Network Rail [15] and Kay [43] to detail the specifi  ailure paths that were activated. We identified 414 
the involvement of DM II and III (as described in Section 4) through three FPW as shown in Figure 9. 415 
The storm generated wave impact and overtopping forces on a previously undamaged section of the 416 










stripped away (Figure 9a) and led to a common cause failure of the foundations due to undermining. 418 
A cascading failure of loss of infill material behind the wall and ballast washout followed (Figure 9b). 419 
At the same time, wave overtopping forces caused flooding of rails and damage to the coping stones 420 
and parapet walls cascading to a ballast washout (Figure 9c). Service was suspended for six days and 421 
for a further seven days of single line closure (Table 2). 422 
 423 
Figure 9. Event flowchart for the 1986 seawall failure. a) Railway engineers inspecting the 424 
foundation failure due to toe scour after wave impact damage [43]. b) The result of overtopping 425 
is shown here: removal of coping and parapet walls [43]. c) Recent example of damage after rail 426 
flooding and ballast washout due to wave overtopping [61].  Where: ST: storm; WI: wave impact 427 
force; DFU: foundations undermined due to toe scour; IL: loss of infill material; WOV: wave 428 
overtopping force; FR: flooding of rails; BW: ballast washout; DCPW: damage to coping stones and 429 











6.2 The February 2014 incident 432 
During February 2014, a series of storms coincided with high tides to cause severe damage to the 433 
rail network in the South West of England. The events were extensively reported in the press and 434 
were the subject of academic articles [14, 44, 57] as well as technical and impact assessments by the 435 
network operator [9, 10, 15] and local community and business groups [16]. We collated this 436 
information into a database of articles, pictures and videos to obtain a clear view of the timeline of the 437 
events and their sequencing specifically in terms of damage to the engineering assets of the railway. A 438 
field survey was conducted in September 2018 to examine the site of the damage and to evaluate the 439 
restoration works undertaken. The local museum in Dawlish7 provided extensive information on the 440 
disaster, augmented by interviews with residents, engineers and emergency workers involved in the 441 
first response and subsequent rebuilding. 442 
The seawall was reported to have failed during storms on the 4th of February 2014, although we 443 
have studied reports and interviews with witnesses which prove the damage was initiated on the 3rd of 444 
February. Evidence suggests that three FPW were activated which led to the two-month suspension of 445 
service as shown in Figure 10. Referring to Section 5, we identified the involvement of DM I, II and 446 
III with the following FPW for the 2014 event: 447 
FPW-1: Long periods of high rainfall were sustained in the area prior and subsequent to the 448 
February damage to the seawall; this had the effect of ausing a large landslide on 21st March 449 
due to slope instability brought on by excess pore pressure in the shear faces of the sandstone 450 
cliffs above the railway line (Figure 10a). This increased the severity of the disaster and 451 
represented a multi-hazard aspect to the event, length ing the period of reconstruction and 452 
significantly impacting on the costs of recovery. 453 











FPW-2: Wave overtopping and flooding of the rails led to significant amounts of direct ballast 454 
washout (Figure 10b); this flooding has the effect of displacing the ballast which supports the 455 
rails and uncovers the backfill material underneath. W en overtopping and wave impact forces 456 
combine, further waves incident on the structure cause the infill to fluidise and become more 457 
mobile – hence material is washed out to sea and additional damage to the masonry structure is 458 
sustained. The result is a V-shaped damage to the wall and hanging rails over a void space 459 
(Figures 1b, 4, 10c). 460 
FPW-5: The storm generated wave impact forces which initiated a common cause failure, 461 
damaging masonry elements in the wall structure cascading to failure of the upper sections of 462 












Figure 10. Event flowchart showing multi-hazard and cascading failures that led to the Dawlish 466 
network failure of February 2014. a) 20,000-tonne landslide between Dawlish and Teignmouth 467 
activating first failure path [55]. b) Failure path with significant wave overtopping flooding rails 468 
and leading to ballast washout. [62] c) Failure path of the upper sections of the seawall due to 469 
wave impact forces [63]. Where: ST: storm; Ue: excess pore pressure in the soil; SI: slope 470 
instability; Ls: landslide; WOV: wave overtopping force; FR: flooding of rails; BW: ballast 471 
washout; WI: wave impact force; DM: damage to masonry elements; FUS: failure of upper 472 
sections of wall; SS: service suspension; FPW: failure pathway. 473 
 474 
7. Discussion 475 
The resilience of coastal railways to natural hazards such as storms and surges is an important 476 
aspect of disaster risk mitigation in those countries with vulnerable transport infrastructure. The 477 
present risk model (Figure 5) is spatially specific to the Southwest England rail mainline through 478 
Dawlish but has application in other coastal railway alignments throughout the UK, such as in 479 
Cumbria, west and south Wales (Figure 1) where similar hazards are encountered and the engineering 480 
assets were constructed during the same era and usig similar design methods. Adaptation of the 481 
hazard elements to include local meteorological and wave environments would allow direct usage of 482 
the model in those regions. An example application w uld be for the analysis of damage events such 483 
as the 3rd January 2014 incident in Cumbria [64, 65]. High spring tides, storms and landward winds 484 
caused extensive damage to the embankments, ballast and track and forced a weeklong suspension of 485 
service near Flimby (Figure 1c). Reports of this event would suggest our DM II and III were activated 486 
with FPW 2,3 and 5 being involved in the cascading failure evident as shown in Figure 11. 487 
This type of model may also be applicable to other countries. Koks et al. [66] in their global risk 488 
analysis report that approximately 27% of all road an  rail assets are exposed to at least one hazard 489 
worldwide. In Italy, coastal infrastructure has been r ported to be vulnerable to wave action and 490 










coastline [68]. For sea level rise and increased storminess, Dawson et al. [44] report potentially 492 
vulnerable coastal transport infrastructure in several major international cities. A key facet of the 493 
proposed model is the adaptive nature of its elements. Kamaza and Noda [69] discuss the effects of 494 
the Japan 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami event, reporting widespread rail network 495 
disruption in over 1700 locations. AIR international [70] in their modelling report of the 2011 great 496 
earthquake and tsunami also point out that water induced damages can outweigh the costs of 497 
earthquake and liquefaction in transport systems over a large spatial scale. Although our risk model 498 
has been developed for extra-tropical storms with hydrodynamic forcing, it has common DM and 499 
FPW that could be used for evaluation of risk following tsunami events. An example of this is DM II - 500 
wave overtopping, where FPW 2 and 3 are activated lea ing to flooding of rails and ballast washout 501 
[71]. These pathways were positively identified along with DM I leading to landslide, DM III leading 502 
to toe scour and loss of infill material behind earth retaining walls [72, 73] and DM IV – wave debris 503 
force, which is a rare occurrence for UK rail networks but a much more important, costly and 504 
common DM in tsunami induced failures [74]. 505 
One of the major strengths of this study and conversely challenges in implementing this approach 506 
to other settings is its reliance on long term recods of damage incidents. The Victorian rail network in 507 
the UK and the coastal alignments are some of the oldest in the world and represent the first attempts 508 
at coastal engineering. The historical record stretches for 170 years with significant contributions i 509 
newspaper articles, books and company records. Our research suggests that significant failure occurs 510 
on average every 8 years. Despite this comprehensive and long-term record there remains some 511 
epistemic uncertainty in the exact nature of the damage and sequence of events, increasing with older 512 
records – this is considered a limitation of the study. The amalgamation of the separate rail companies 513 
into GWR and then British Rail in the 1950’s and the rationalisation of records means some details of 514 
engineering interventions have been lost, and newspaper articles by their nature are non-technical so 515 
accentuating the uncertainty. The model is based on the hazard-vulnerability of the Dawlish railway, 516 
characterised by a vertical masonry seawall elevating the rail alignment above normal high tide level. 517 










historically provided nourishment for the beach. The age of the asset will affect its vulnerability and 519 
the application of the model to other Victorian coastal railways will be dependent on these criteria. 520 
However, the methodology and systematic identification of separate force mechanisms from a single 521 
initiating event provides a valuable tool for infrastructure stakeholders to tailor the model for diverse 522 
application as demonstrated briefly by reference to the Cumbrian mainline in north-west England and 523 
potential application to tsunami related damage following the 2011 event in Japan. 524 
 525 
Figure 11. Event flowchart showing multi-hazard and cascading failures that led to the Cumbria 526 
network failure of January 2014. a) Network Rail inspecting rail bed failure near Flimby [64]. b) 527 
Google Earth picture (2020) showing new rock armour reinforcement at same position. Where: 528 
ST: storm; DM: damage mechanism; WOV: wave overtopping force; FR: flooding of rails; BW: 529 
ballast washout; DCPW: damage to coping and parapet walls; WI: wave impact force; DM: damage 530 
to masonry elements; FUS: failure of upper sections of wall; FPW: failure pathway; SS: service 531 













8. Conclusions  534 
We developed a multi-hazard risk model with cascading FPW for the Dawlish railway through 535 
retrieving and analysing major damage incidents in the period 1846-2014 with the aim of risk 536 
reduction. This approach allowed us to: 537 
  Identify 29 damage events of significant engineering impact (i.e. line closure more than 12 538 
h) on the Dawlish railway in the period 1846-2014 through archival research of historical 539 
and contemporary data.  540 
 Based on the railway damage data, the three most frequent DM were identified which are: 541 
(I) landslide, (II) direct ballast washout due to wave overtopping, (III) failure of the upper 542 
sections of the wall and loss of infill material after foundation failure due to wave impact 543 
force which cascade to indirect ballast washout. 544 
 For each of the 29 failure events, we have identified the common hazard involved, 545 
deconstructed the sequence of civil engineering failures and formulated a flowchart for each 546 
event, showing the interrelationship of multiple hazards and their potential to cascade.  547 
 For the February 2014 railway damage incident in Dawlish, three FPW were identified: 1) 548 
the storm generated wave impact forces which damaged masonry elements in the wall 549 
structure cascading to failure of the upper sections f wall and ballast washout; 2) Washout 550 
exacerbated by additional wave overtopping leading to flooding of the rails; displacing the 551 
ballast and uncovering the backfill material underneath; 3) Intensive rainfall caused a large 552 
landslide due to slope instability brought on by excess pore pressure in the shear faces of the 553 
sandstone cliffs above the railway line.  554 
 We were then able to develop a risk model for the civil engineering assets associated with 555 
the railway network in Dawlish with the potential to provide stakeholders with a 556 
probability-based method of risk evaluation following further development. Our proposed 557 










generation (debris impact, wave impact, overtopping, excess pore pressure, wind impacts); 559 
(c) common cause failure (foundation scour, masonry damage, rail flooding, slope 560 
instability); (d) cascading failure (landslide, ballast washout, upper masonry seawall failure, 561 
loss of infill material), and (e) network failure forcing service suspension.  562 
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